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Abstract
The most important policy instrument to promote regional devel-
opment in the European Union is Strucutral Funds, covering approxi-
mately a third of the EU budget. An empirical analysis demonstrates
that these funds have on average been ineﬀective in speeding up the
process of convergence within the European Union. Only in countries
with suﬃciently good institutions have these funds contributed pos-
itively to regional development. Our analysis attempts to shed light
on how investment subsidies may create industrialization, and more
importantly, how poor quality institutions may prevent this strategy
from succeeding.
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1 Introduction
The attraction into lagging-behind economy of public and/or private ﬁrms is
high on the political agenda in both developed and developing country. The
consensus around these policies reached a peak in the sixties and seventies
when “growth poles”, “big push” and similar expressions where considered
magic words. The poor success of many (if not most) of the policy experiences
inspired by this philosophy has cooled oﬀ the enthusiasm and optimism of
t h o s ey e a r s .I nt h eE u r o p e a nU n i o n ,t h em o s ti m p o r t a n tp o l i c yi n s t r u m e n tt o
promote regional development is Structural Funds, covering approximately a
third of the EU budget. In an empirical analysis of the European Structural
Funds, Ederveen et al (2004) demonstrate that these funds have on average
1been ineﬀective in speeding up the process of convergence within the Euro-
pean Union. Their study shows that these funds have been eﬀective only in
countries with suﬃciently good institutions.
Our analysis attempts to shed light on how investment subsidies may
create industrialization, and more importantly, how poor quality institutions
may prevent this strategy from succeeding. We focus on the response by
local entrepreneurs to regional development policies. These policies may take
diﬀerent forms, but essentially involve an inﬂow of funds (aid) to a region.
In our model entrepreneurs may respond to the aid either by investing and
innovating or by rent-seeking. If a suﬃciently large number of entrepreneurs
choose rent-seeking, the policy is likely to be a failure. If, on the other hand,
the local entrepreneurs take advantage of the capital subsidy, the result may
be a move to a higher income equilibrium. The model analyses the conditions
under which rent-seeking is the more likely response to regional aid, and
when this aid is likely to trigger innovation and investment. We draw policy
implications with respect to the optimal policy design of regional aid.
Our model is based on the dual technology, limit pricing model of Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), and in particular on a simpliﬁed version of this
model presented in Krugman (1992).
2M o d e l
Consider an economy consisting of L workers producing N goods. Each of
these goods can be produced by means of two technologies, traditional and
modern. The traditional technology is constant returns to scale, one unit
of labor producing one unit of output. We will sometimes refer to this as
the informal sector. The modern technology is increasing returns to scale,
described by the following labor input requirement:
Li = F + αQi,( 1 )
where Li is the labor input in the production of good Qi, F is a ﬁxed
startup cost (which can be interpreted as a capital investment), and α < 1
is the marginal labor input requirement. Demand for the N goods is Cobb
Douglas and symmetric. This means that a share 1/N of income is spent on
each good.
The supply price in the traditional sector is unity. This is a perfectly
competitive sector. Modern technology, if it is introduced, is controlled by
2a single entrepreneur for each good. The monopoly power of this ﬁrm is,
however, constrained by the potential entry of small-scale producers in the
informal sector. With Cobb Douglas preferences, demand is unit elastic.
Hence, the optimal pricing decision without competition would be to set the
price inﬁnitely high. Given potential entry by small scale producers, the
optimal pricing decision is one of limit pricing. The modern sector producer
will charge a price marginally below unity, and thereby capture the entire
market for its product.
Modern sector producers must pay a wage premium relative to what a
worker makes in the informal sector. This wage premium may reﬂect a legally
deﬁned minimum wage, and/or perhaps compensation for workers’ everyday
travel to and from work. Let the formal sector wage be given by w>1.
With only traditional production, total income is given by only labor













Figure 1 describes production costs and revenues of a representative pro-
ducer. The production functions, which also represent revenue functions
(since prices are unity), are given by T for traditional technology and M
for modern technology. Production costs in the modern sector are given by
W = wLi. The traditional equilibrium is given by point a and the modern
equilibrium by point c. Due to the symmetry of the problem, labor input is
L/N in both equilibria.
Take the traditional equilibrium, a, as point of departure. This is a sta-
ble equilibrium since any single entrepreneur will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
undertake the investment necessary to introduce modern technology. Disre-
garding income eﬀects, the demand facing this producer is QT. Implementing
modern technology reduces labor input, and leads to income given by point
b. Clearly, given the modern sector wage premium, this is not a proﬁtable
investment.
On the other hand, if the entrepreneurs in a coordinated move managed












Figure 1: Traditional and modern equilibrium
c. Clearly, income for each formal sector producer here exceeds costs. In-
tuitively, by investing together, proﬁts are created that give rise to income
that is spent on all goods. The fundamental problem with industrialization
in this model is therefore one of externalities. Each producer does not take
into account the added demand that his or her investment generates for all
other producers in the economy. There is therefore room for government
intervention in order to stimulate a coordinated investment eﬀort. In less
developed economies, the investment stimulus sometimes comes in the form
of an investment subsidy from abroad, one example being EUs Structural
Funds.
2.1 Regional policy
The investment subsidy is captured by our model by a reduction in the ﬁxed
investment cost F.E a c hﬁrm receives a subsidy R. Figure 2 demonstrates
how such a subsidy may lead to modernization by making it proﬁtable for a
single entrepreneur to implement modern technology in an otherwise entirely
traditional economy. The subsidy leads to a shift in the M-line to M0.O n c e
this investment has been made, this strengthens the proﬁtability of invest-
4ment for the other entrepreneurs, the result being a move from point a,v i a
















Figure 2: Regional policy
2.2 Rent seeking
The investment aid is assumed to be administered by the local government.
The quality of this government determines the degree to which the investment
funds actually end up where they are supposed to. Each ﬁrm may have an
incentive to oﬀer bribes or lobby the local government for special treatment.
Or perhaps corrupt local bureaucrats demand bribes in order to pay out
the investment subsidy that the ﬁrms were supposed to get for free. The
degree to which a given bribe actually reduces ﬁrms’ startup costs is given
by (1 − λ),w h e r eλ is an inverse measure of institutional quality, such as a
corruption index. If λ =0 , the entire investment subsidy reaches the ﬁrms,
and the analysis is as described in Figure 2. If, on the other hand, λ =1 ,
there is complete rent dissipation, and the investment aid does not aﬀect
ﬁrms’ startup costs at all. The analysis is then as described by Figure 1.
Hence, for a given R, there exists a critical level of corruption, λ
∗,a b o v e
which structural funds have no eﬀect on the economy at all. For levels of
5corruption below λ
∗, structural funds may move the economy from a low
income equilibrium to a higher income equilibrium.
Thus, our model provides a formalization of the empirical ﬁnding in Ed-
erveen et al (2004) that structural funds are eﬀective only if the institutional
quality of the recipient government is suﬃciently good.
3C o n c l u s i o n
The present model demonstrates how institutional quality may aﬀect the
impact of investment subsidies. In a situation with a week institutional envi-
ronment, investment aid will trigger lobbying and rent seeking, thus reducing
the net eﬀect of the policy on ﬁrms’ start up costs. In a situation with a higher
quality institutional environment, however, such funds may reduce the costs
of investing in modern technology, and may thus cause the economy to move
from a low income, traditional technology equilibrium, to a higher income,
modern technology equilibrium.
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